legal system, which means that much of the material required to prove a connection to the land will not be reduced to written form. 12 The historical inquiry required for the proof of native title has sparked renewed vigour in the debate between law and history. Following the High Court's Mabo and Wik decisions it was expected that both history and historians would have an important role in the resolution of native title claims. 13 Mabo's rewriting of the law (through the rejection of the doctrine of terra nullius) was accompanied by a rewriting of Australia's history, meaning that the work of historians such as Henry Reynolds assumed national prominence. 14 Rather than endorsing a history of a settled colony, as had earlier decisions such as Cooper v Stuart, 15 the majority judgments in Mabo acknowledged that, for indigenous people, history had often meant dispossession and destruction. 16 Given this prelude, it is perhaps surprising that historians have so far played only a small part in the litigation of native claims under the NTA and have been notably overshadowed by anthropologists. 17 Perhaps because of their involvement with land claims under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), 18 it is anthropologists who have been the dominant experts in native title determinations. 19 Sparked in part by this discrepancy, there is an emerging debate about history and native title. 20 Much of this literature draws upon the experiences of historians and lawyers who have been involved in the litigation of claims, 21 and while some of it touches upon epistemological questions, it does not offer a rigorous analysis in terms of the proof of native title.
The most recent contribution to the debate is the book Rights and Redemption: History, Law and Indigenous People by Ann Curthoys, Ann Genovese and Alexander Reilly. 22 The book takes a broad approach, charting the interactions between historians and lawyers in a variety of legal settings, including native title disputes. The book offers a useful discursive account of some of the difficulties this interaction has produced, for example when historians have been called as expert witnesses. While it touches upon some of the difficulties claimants face in establishing the existence of native title, it does not seek to analyse rigorously the conceptual basis of legal decisionmaking and how historians can be involved in that process.
What the existing literature does indicate is that lawyers' and historians' reasons for unearthing the past often differ. When courts adjudicate native title claims they are required to make conclusive decisions about the past. 23 As former Federal Court judge Robert Nicholson remarked extra-judicially, ' [a] hearing is not a seminar … It is a definitive moment in determining legal rights.' 24 The trial judge is presented with competing versions of the past and must ultimately choose a single narrative.
Historians too seek an approximation of the past but, as is widely acknowledged, their role is fundamentally different to that of a judge. 25 Historians are not required to make decisions that determine legal rights and responsibilities, and their accounts of the past can be continually revised and revisited. Historians themselves are rarely united in their methods, aims or assumptions, and both inside and outside the courtroom historical knowledge is constructed and often conflicting. From the Whigs to the postmodernists, historians have adopted varying approaches to the study of the past. Most contemporary historians would eschew the idea of a single, authoritative There is … no 'supreme court of historical interpretation' with the power to settle a dispute with finality, and historians … would find the notion of such a court ludicrous, repugnant, or both. 26 A lack of appreciation of these differing roles and responsibilities has meant thatin both scholarly debate and their encounters in court -lawyers and historians have failed to interact meaningfully. Historians have tended to criticise the rigidities of the law's processes, whereas courts have assumed that their traditional approach to factfinding can simply uncover the distant past, 27 without the need for assistance. While it has been noted that the interaction between the two disciplines must take place on 'law's home ground', 28 too often the discussions have focused simply on the need for historians to 'play by the lawyers' rules'. 29 True as this is, it does not address the fundamental nature of how courts operate. If historians and historical thinking are to contribute meaningfully, it must be within the confines of the adjudicative process.
This article extends the existing literature by clarifying, in legal terms, just how this contribution can occur. To do this, it analyses the definition and proof of facts in native title claims in evidentiary terms. The article is concerned, predominantly, with how history and historical perspectives can be accommodated within the regime set down by Parliament and the confines of the adjudicative process. While it acknowledges that 'history' itself is contested, and there are many debates about how history should be understood and what methods it should employ, these are largely beyond the scope of this article. These debates warrant further consideration, but this article argues that there must first be an understanding of how it is that the adjudicative system can engage with the various perspectives offered by historians.
The requirements of proof have been set down by the legislature in s 223(1) of the NTA, but as Part I demonstrates, there is considerable ambiguity within these requirements. Part II analyses the inferential proof of these stipulated material facts, arguing that historians can assist by providing generalisations of knowledge that can influence both the selection of evidence and the inferences drawn from this evidence. Finally, Part III considers whether the influence of historians can extend further to inform the selection of the material facts. Although courts are obliged to seek a single narrative, historians might assist the courts' choices by informing what particular single narrative of the past is sought.
These themes are examined in the context of native title jurisprudence in Australia. 30 interpretation of the material facts of native title, and so is central to any discussion of the problems of proof. Although the judgments have spawned a variety of case-notes and commentaries, 32 particularly because of the widespread disappointment that accompanied the result, 33 there remains a need for a more rigorous analysis of the case in inferential terms. Aspects of the case are examined in this article from an evidentiary perspective, and are contrasted with more recent jurisprudence from the Federal Court, where the Court has grappled with the requirements laid down in Yorta Yorta.
I REQUIREMENTS OF PROOF IN NATIVE TITLE CLAIMS
When courts are required to unearth the past and make findings of historical fact, as they are in native title claims, they must make definitive decisions about the past. These decisions are dictated by the material facts, which are derived from s 223 (1) 
A
The nature of native title under the NTA The NTA's recognition of native title 'translates' traditional rights into rights that are commensurable with other rights, meaning that they can be enforced by Australia's 'ordinary' legal system. 36 The content of particular native title rights and interests is derived from indigenous law and custom, and so must be determined in each case as a matter of fact. 37
B
Material facts required to prove native title Section 223(1) provides: The courts have read this section as involving two separate but related factual inquiries, noting that the same evidence may be relevant to both questions. 38 As Selway J noted, the court must determine 'as a matter of fact' the questions raised in paragraphs (a) and (b), but it is not required to 'apply, administer or enforce traditional law'. 39 Paragraph (c) raises issues of law, which are dependent on the two factual inquiries. 40 The first factual inquiry involves the identification of both the relevant laws and customs, and the rights and interests in relation to land or waters that stem from these 
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Volume 36 ____________________________________________________________________________________ laws and customs. 41 Following the High Court's decision in Ward, and the conceptualisation of native title as a 'bundle of rights', it is necessary for the rights and interests that comprise native title to be separately identified. 42 The second factual inquiry necessitates a connection with the land or waters under the traditional laws and customs that have been identified. Central to both factual inquiries is the interpretation of the requirement of 'traditional', which carries implications in terms of both continuity and connection.
While the courts are clear that there are two factual inquiries to be undertaken, precisely what these inquiries entail is far from self-evident. This part focuses on the current construction of the material facts endorsed by the majority of the High Court in Yorta Yorta, although in Part III alternative constructions are considered.
C
Interpretation of 'traditional' In Yorta Yorta 43 the majority's interpretation of s 223(1), and the key word 'traditional', epitomises a narrow approach to the formulation of the material facts.
The majority's interpretation was informed by its analysis of the conceptual underpinnings of native title and, in particular, the effect of the intersection of two normative systems. 44 As there could be no parallel law-making system operating after the assertion of sovereignty, the majority held that the only rights or interests capable of recognition were those originating in pre-sovereignty laws and customs. 45 This pre-sovereignty requirement decisively affected the majority's interpretation of the word 'traditional'. In addition to expressing the way in which laws and customs were transmitted, the majority held that the word contained two other elements. First, it referred to the age or time-span of traditions: the laws or customs must have their origins in the 'normative rules' of indigenous societies that existed prior to sovereignty. 46 Secondly, the 'normative system under which the rights and interests are possessed' must have had a 'continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty'. 47 Without this continuity of the normative system, the rights and interests would cease and could not later be revived. 48 This construction of the word 'traditional' requires an inquiry into the relationship between the observance of particular laws and customs in the past and in the Ibid. present. 49 The claimants must prove that traditional laws and customs were acknowledged and observed prior to sovereignty, that they are acknowledged and observed in the present, and that there is a connection between the two. 50 The nature of this connection between past and present was also informed by the particular meaning given to the word 'traditional'. In order for present practices to be properly described as 'traditional', the majority held that the claimants must prove that laws and customs have been acknowledged and observed 'substantially uninterrupted' since the time of sovereignty. 51 This requirement of substantial continuity impacted upon the extent to which changes or disruptions could be permitted. 52 D 'Connection' with the land The second factual inquiry, mandated by s 223(1)(b), requires the establishment of a 'connection' with the land or waters, by the traditional laws and customs identified in the first inquiry. 53 As with subsection (1)(a), the notion of continuity is imported through the interpretation of the word 'traditional': the laws and customs by which the connection with the land is established must have continued substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty. 54
E
The nature of proof in native title Once the material facts have been isolated, the court must consider whether these facts can be inferred from the available evidence. This requires an understanding of how the notion of proof is approached in the context of native title.
Although there are some unique evidentiary procedures in native title proceedings, 55 and the possibility of suspending the rules of evidence, 56 the standard of proof remains the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. 57 In other contexts it has been suggested that the civil standard of proof is to be applied flexibly, and is contingent upon the nature of the cause of action. 58 evidence sufficient to achieve this standard will vary according to the nature of the fact to be proved. 59 Given the nature of the available evidence in native title cases the courts have recognised that proof will, of necessity, involve drawing inferences back to times before the memory of the witnesses. 60 Testimony from Aboriginal witnesses will typically relay oral traditions stretching back only three or occasionally four generations, with the result that the 'historical timeline' will be incomplete. 61 The current interpretation of s 223(1), requiring the proof of laws and customs at the time of sovereignty, means that the inferential leaps necessary for a successful claim will be larger than those required in conventional cases.
The necessity for, and nature of, these inferential leaps was considered in Mason v Tritton. 62 In this case a native title 'right to fish' was raised in defence to a charge of being in possession of abalone contrary to NSW fisheries legislation. The appellant submitted that a 'presumption of continuance' ought to apply due to the lack of evidence for the period between 1788 and the 1880s. 63 Kirby P was of the view that these evidential hurdles could be overcome by what should correctly be described as a 'process of inference', whereby facts in the present could be used to infer the existence of facts in the past, absent intervening events. 64 According to Kirby P, such a process of inference was demanded by the nature of native title claims:
In the nature of Aboriginal society, their many deprivations and disadvantages following European settlement of Australia and the limited record keeping of the earliest days, it is next to impossible to expect that Aboriginal Australians will ever be able to prove, by recorded details, their precise genealogy back to the time before 1788. In these circumstances, it would be unreasonable and unrealistic for the common law of Australia to demand such proof for the establishment of a claim to native title. 65 This process of inference has been applied in subsequent native title determinations, due to the impossibility of establishing 'what the facts actually were' at the time of sovereignty. 66 dealing with proof of custom extending back to 'time immemorial', commenting that this type of evidentiary inference should be applicable in the context of proving native title if there was evidence that customs or traditions had 'always' been observed. 68 In Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v State of Western Australia (No 9) Lindgren J agreed that, in principle, such inferences of retrospective continuance are possible. 69 He noted, however, that such inferences will depend on the available evidence and will be easier to draw over shorter periods of time. 70 This process of drawing inferences back to the past presents a clear opportunity for historians -with their skills and experience in uncovering and understanding the evidentiary archive -to contribute to the process of proof.
II EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE: PROVING THE MATERIAL FACTS
The process of proving material facts involves, in essence, the establishment of a link between the tendered evidence and the material facts. This link between the evidence and the material facts can be understood as comprising two separate but interrelated parts: the collection of surviving traces from the past, and the evaluation of the weight to be given to this evidence. This dual process does not occur in isolation, but is informed by the fact-finder's experiences in the world and what might be described as their background 'generalisation[s] of knowledge'. 71 George F James has suggested that 'in every instance proof must be based upon a generalization connecting the evidentiary proposition with the proposition to be proved'. 72 Other evidence scholars have agreed that proof is premised upon such generalisations, although the concept has been expressed in slightly different terms. W A N Wells, for instance, employed the phrase 'natural logic' to refer to learnt experiences based on life in the community, suggesting that these experiences influence whether the evidence provides a persuasive 'approximation' of 'reality'. 73 This part considers how historians might assist courts in their approximation of the past by providing generalisations of knowledge. Historians' experience in reading colonial documentary archives makes them alive to gaps, patterns and problems in documentary records in a way that many lawyers are not. For example, particular phrases may have an interpretation beyond the literal meaning of the words on the page. In this way, historians may provide a different prism through which to view the evidence, which can influence both the selection of evidence and the inference of the material facts. These will be considered in turn. 
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A
Selection of evidence In the adjudicative process the admission of evidence is driven by the notion of relevance. Relevance is central to the activities of both lawyers and historians, notwithstanding that their reasons for turning to the past often differ. While for lawyers uncovering the past is necessary only for the purposes of resolving a present dispute, historians are concerned to understand the past in all its complexity. 74 Typically, the lawyer's inquiry will be narrow, circumscribed by strictly defined ends (the discrete material facts in dispute), whereas the historian's investigation will span a broader time-frame so that context can be appreciated and wider patterns discerned. Historians can largely define their own ends, and in doing so define what will be considered relevant.
These differing pursuits of the past, and corresponding notions of relevance, can create obstacles for the interaction of lawyers and historians. Historians' intellectual freedom permits them to pursue various avenues of inquiry that a court may reject as irrelevant. For example, in the Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) stolen generations case 75 O'Loughlin J held that Mr Gunner's mother had given informed consent to his removal, implicitly rejecting historical evidence that sought to elucidate the wider context which might have indicated informed consent was unlikely. 76 However, in the context of native title it is precisely because the courts' inquiries must span such a long historical period that the broader approaches of historians might be instructive in assessing relevance. This can be illustrated by comparing the judgments of Olney J at first instance and Black CJ in the Full Federal Court in Yorta Yorta.
Olney J and Black CJ divided on the question of whether the inquiry into traditional laws and customs should begin in the past or the present. Some commentators have questioned the effect of this, suggesting that changes (and therefore disruption to traditional lifestyles) are more likely to be discerned if the past is taken as the starting point. 77 The real difference though, it seems, can be explained in terms of relevance. Olney J began his inquiry in the past and made the determinative finding that by the 1880s the observance of traditional law and custom had ceased. 78 His inquiry stopped at this point: he did not think it necessary to make findings about present-day practices, as once expired native title cannot be revived. 79 Black CJ regarded this approach as incomplete, and his judgment illustrates how historical perspectives might illuminate relevance. Black CJ held that evidence from living witnesses about the continuance of traditional practices 'needed to be dealt with before a finding could be made that native title had come to an end'. 80 He emphasised the need to take a broad 'historical snapshot' that considered evidence from an extensive period of time, reasoning that a discrete historical inquiry makes it impossible to determine whether a change is simply an evolution or adaptation, or represents a complete interruption. 81 Black CJ's broader historical perspective meant that all available evidence was considered relevant, thereby creating a broader base for drawing inferences of continuity.
B
The role of generalisations in inferring the material facts In addition to contributing to the selection of 'relevant' evidence, historians might assist in the inferential proof of the material facts. Evidence does not speak for itself or present automatic factual conclusions; rather, a process of inference enables propositions to be established as a matter of probability. 82 While Wigmore and evidence scholars who have followed him have attempted to express this inferential process in logical terms, 83 it is not divorced from reality but is again dependent upon background generalisations of knowledge. 84 This process can be expressed in deductive form, so that the particular generalisation that drives the inferential analysis can be isolated. To take a simple example, if it is known that D had a fixed plan to kill V, an inference that D probably murdered V rests upon the generalisation that 'fixed designs are probably carried out'. 85 The validity of this particular inference may be challenged by critiquing the generalisation on which it is based. Historians might assist at this level, as their experiences in unearthing the past can inform the generalisations underpinning the inferential process.
C
Historians as expert witnesses Historians who have given evidence in native title cases about the history of a particular claim area often complain about being relegated to mere gatherers of factual data. They have expressed frustration that the court is not interested in their expertise in explaining the silences or perspectives of sources. 86 The law's insistence on a demarcation between 'fact' and 'opinion' 87 is difficult for historians, who are conscious that the very process of selecting 'facts' unavoidably involves interpretation. 
82
I am using the term 'inference' in the Wigmorean sense, which assumes it is possible to discern some rational relationship between the evidence and the factual propositions drawn from this evidence. See Ligertwood, above n 10, 7-12. 
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Volume 36 ____________________________________________________________________________________ While some judges are optimistic that the courts can accommodate the perspectives of historians, 88 others have not been so willing to recognise historical expertise. The admissibility of expert opinion evidence in the Federal Court is governed by s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which requires that the opinion be based on 'specialised knowledge'. This term is not defined by the Act and so the common law authorities, which indicate that the test is whether the expert can assist the trier of fact in reaching a more reliable decision, 89 have guided its interpretation. 90 In Bellevue Crescent v Marland Holdings Young J considered that the question of the admissibility of historians' evidence was novel. 91 Based on his review of existing authorities, Young J suggested there was a distinction between the 'facts of history' and 'what might be called social history'. 92 The latter type of history was not, in his mind, the proper subject of opinion evidence:
Whilst courts may obtain the basal facts such as when a particular war broke out or other matters of record from reputable histories, analyses as to why certain things happened and generally how people behaved is not a matter which can be proved by the evidence of people who were not there but have ascertained the historical facts and then have analysed them to work out a conclusion. 93 His Honour was invited to receive opinion evidence from two historians concerning the use of land in inner Sydney in the 1800s, so that the terms of a deed could be construed. Although noting that these historians were 'eminently acceptable in the community', Young J was of the view that the 'knowledge of an historian' did not fit within the ambit of s 79. 94 First, he considered that the knowledge was 'based on the hearsay material of the past', a reason which was contrary to contemporary and later authorities permitting the use of expert knowledge (opinions) based on hearsay to draw inferences from basic facts, 95 and secondly he considered the opinion was not 'wholly or substantially based upon that knowledge but, rather, … an analysis.' 96 . This second reason suggests that Young J did not regard historical 'analysis' as 'specialised knowledge' that would assist him in drawing inferences. This reflects an assumption that historical documents can be interpreted without assistance.
Despite this rejection of historical expertise, in other cases judges have been more willing to accept that historians may provide assistance. For instance, in Anderson v Wilson Beaumont J noted that expert historical evidence would be required if, contrary to his analysis of the precedential force of Wik, it was necessary to reconsider the High Court majority's interpretation of historical documents relating to the origins of pastoral leases. 97 Further, in recent native title determinations historians have been among the plethora of experts called by both claimants and respondents, and their evidence has largely been accepted. 98 However, some of Young J's reservations remain. In Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) Lindgren J considered numerous objections to expert reports. These reports, some of which were prepared by historians, expressed opinions about the 'complex question' of whether the claimants were relevantly connected to the land. 99 Lindgren J questioned whether the historians' perspectives about the interpretation of evidence should properly fall within the notion of 'opinion' evidence. 100 His Honour noted that it was difficult to distinguish between 'analysis, synthesis and summary of factual material' and the 'drawing of inferences', 101 commenting that:
In some cases an interpretation is offered of the terms of a single letter. Generally speaking, I do not think an historian is qualified in terms of s 79 of the Evidence Act to give expert opinion of that kind. 102 Lindgren J admitted the historical reports (as no party was objecting in principle to their admissibility) but questioned whether parts of them should not more properly be received as 'submission as to the interpretation I should place on historical data' rather than as opinion evidence. 103 
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D
Evaluating the evidence in Yorta Yorta The Yorta Yorta trial provides a clear illustration of the problems of this approach, and how the generalisations employed by the fact-finder may be critiqued by historians. In the course of his judgment Olney J remarked that the facts 'lead inevitably to the conclusion' that the claimants' ancestors had 'ceased to occupy their traditional lands in accordance with their traditional laws and customs', and that any acknowledgement and observance of those laws and customs had been 'washed away' by the 'tide of history'. 105 This finding proved to be decisive, as it was upheld by majorities in the Full Federal Court and High Court. 106 However, as this article argues, the conclusion reached by Olney J was by no means inevitable, but was premised upon particular generalisations about the strengths of the available evidence.
Olney J's evaluation of the evidence was guided by the assumption that written records emanating from the nineteenth century were unproblematic and, indeed, provided the best window to the period under review. In contrast, oral tradition was viewed with suspicion: it was merely a 'further source of evidence' that should be given 'less weight' than other more reliable (European) evidence. 107 Olney J placed particular reliance on the writings of Curr, a pastoralist who lived in the claim area during the 1840s. 108 Curr's writings were regarded as the 'most credible' information about the 1840s, and were used to detail the content of the traditional laws and customs of the claimants' ancestors. 109 As he had done with the questions of indigenous occupation of the land 110 and genealogical descent, 111 Olney J indicated he was prepared to draw inferences from known facts about the observance of traditional practices in the 1840s back to the time of sovereignty. 112 The difficulty came when Olney J assessed the period after the 1840s, finding that there had been an interruption at this time. 113 He relied heavily on the writings of the missionary Matthews, and in particular the absence of commentary about the continued observance of traditional lifestyles during the Maloga mission era in the 1860s. 114 Coupled with this evidentiary silence was a petition signed in 1881 by 42 Aboriginal people. Although tendered by the claimants as evidence of their ongoing efforts to assert rights to land, 115 Olney J interpreted the petition as evincing an intention to relinquish land. He regarded the petition as 'positive evidence' 116 that could support an inference that by the 1880s the claimants' ancestors had ceased observing traditional laws and customs. 117 So pervasive were his Honour's evidentiary assumptions that they affected his evaluation of the more recent evidence tendered. Despite not viewing this evidence as relevant once he had found an interruption, Olney J considered it 'appropriate' to make some comments about current beliefs and practices. 118 These comments indicate that Curr's writings were treated as the standard against which all later practices must be measured, with the result that these practices were not viewed as sufficiently 'traditional'. 119
_____________________________________________________________________________________

E
Historians and generalisations of knowledge The above analysis illustrates the consequences of the finder of fact as his or her own historian. Historians could have assisted by providing different generalisations with which to assess the evidence, with the result that Olney J may have been less inclined to draw the inference that the observance of traditional laws and customs had ceased by the mid-nineteenth century.
Two historians were called by the State of Victoria, 120 but apart from noting that they were called, Olney J's judgment provides no mention of the evidence they gave or their assistance to the Court. Experts from other disciplines detailed the historical record, and provided suggested interpretations of the data, 121 but ultimately Olney J appeared to assume he needed no assistance with the interpretation of documentary evidence. 122 Olney J's assumption that colonial writers could provide the best access to the past is one that many contemporary historians would find troubling. 123 historical narratives, 124 conscious of both the silences and biases in documents created by and for the colonisers. 125 Olney J appeared oblivious to this type of historiography. Instead, he accepted colonial writings as both an accurate and authoritative account of traditional law and custom. Furthermore, Olney J failed to address properly the weaknesses of the written evidence. He did note that early European observers possessed no special qualifications or training, 126 that Curr's recollections were subject to some temporal and geographical limitations, 127 and that contemporary scholars have disagreed over the interpretation of these records. 128 However, Olney J did not undertake a rigorous examination of the evidence, and failed to appreciate the significance of questions basic to historical methodology, such as why and for whom Curr was writing. He did not consider it important that Curr's observations were not published until the 1880s, 129 and were thus susceptible to embellishments and variations in memory over several decades. 130 Olney J's finding that the observance of traditional laws and customs had ceased by the 1880s provides a clear illustration of how different generalisations might have affected the inferences he drew. Despite acknowledging that the missionary Matthews was an 'architect of further disruption of traditional life', 131 Olney J did not examine the reasons why the written records, obviously a product of missionary society, were likely to be silent about the continued practice of traditional ways. 132 Further, he did not examine what types of observance might have been possible within the constraints of the missionary environment. 133 Similarly, Olney J's interpretation of the 1881 petition can be questioned, thus disturbing his assumption that it reflected a clear intention to surrender land. The petitioners could not use their own language to communicate, 134 and the influence of Matthews may have been greater than Olney J acknowledged. 135 The colonial records that is largely absent in the other judgments in the case. He noted, for instance, the need to consider factors such as the viewpoint and preconceptions of the author, the purpose for which they were writing, their intended audience, their access to and connection with indigenous people, and the time-frame of their observations. 136 Colonial diaries and notes of casual observers, he suggested, might not provide an accurate description of indigenous lifestyles:
The external and casual viewer of another culture may see very little because the people observed may intend to reveal very little to an outsider, or because the observer may be looking at the wrong time, or because the observer may not know what to look for, or for any one of numerous other reasons. 137 The practical importance of these observations was demonstrated when Black CJ addressed the petition. Black CJ, it seems, may have been less willing to draw an inference of 'abandonment' due to his adoption of different generalisations. 138 He noted that the petition was 'essentially a political document', and suggested that the words 'taken possession of' may have been understood differently as between the signatories and the author of the petition. 139 Further, Black CJ was more attuned to the nuances of the historical record. He did not proceed upon the assumption that changes or disruption necessarily heralded the cessation of traditional laws and customs. For instance, although noting that the alienation of land for pastoral purposes and the corresponding dislocation of the indigenous inhabitants 'may be accepted as historical fact', 140 in contrast to Olney J, 141 he emphasised that disruption did not necessarily mean there was a complete 'displacement' of native title. 142
F
Proof post-Yorta Yorta? By critiquing aspects of Olney J's decision in Yorta Yorta, this part has suggested that historical perspectives can impact upon both the selection of evidence and the inferences drawn from this evidence.
Recent determinations indicate that some judges are becoming more conscious of the impact of historical understandings. For instance, Nicholson J in Daniel v Western Australia 143 recognised that the interpretation of the historical record was dependent upon particular generalisations of knowledge:
It must be always borne in mind that the historical record is incomplete. There are 'silences'. The nature of these 'silences' and the manner in which they should be addressed is the subject not merely of academic interest, but one that bears directly upon the approach the Court must take … to derive the inferences that of necessity must be made . In stark contrast to Olney J's literal reading of the evidence in Yorta, Nicholson J acknowledged the ethnocentricity of, and gaps in, the historical record. 145 Nicholson J's general observations about the shortcomings of the written record were accompanied by a willingness to accept the expertise of historians in interpreting colonial sources. 146 His Honour went on to find that despite disruptions to traditional lifestyles, including the loss of language 147 and the lack of physical presence, 148 the claimants had not lost their connection to the land. 149 To make this finding Nicholson J assessed all of the evidence (including that relating to current-day observance of laws and customs). He noted that although the impact of European settlement had 'brought them towards the cusp' of their traditional connection being 'washed away by the tide of history', this time had not 'yet arrived'. 150 These comments suggest that it was only a matter of time before the traditional connection to the land would be lost. 151 This situation seems to have eventuated in
Gale v Minister for Land & Water Conservation (NSW)
. 152 The circumstances of this case were unusual in that the applicants elected to offer no evidence and withdrew from further participation in the proceedings so that a freehold title could be granted under legislation. 153 Ultimately what was sought was a determination that native title did not exist, and the judge had to be satisfied on the intended evidence that such a determination could be made. 154 An examination of Madgwick J's reasoning reveals his Honour cannot be critiqued on the same grounds as Olney J in Yorta Yorta. He did consider current evidence that might have supported an inference of present connection with the claim area. However, he found that there was 'scant evidence' of physical presence, places of significance or oral tradition that could support any 'actual link' with the land. 155 Madgwick J also acknowledged the risk that he might be 'ethnocentrically overattracted to the writings of white authority figures such as senior scholars in anthropology and history', and that these figures might be 'at risk of ethnocentric overattraction to written records and written opinions of scholars and others.' 156 Nevertheless, Madgwick J found that there had been a 'complete rupture with traditional ways' and that the changes could not be characterised as adaptations. 157 In both Gale and Daniel the judges' evidentiary selections and evaluations can be contrasted with those of Olney J, illustrating how differing historical understandings might impact upon the fact-finder's generalisations of knowledge. These generalisations, though, will not always be decisive. In situations where there have been considerable changes since colonisation, the difficulties of proof will be insurmountable. 158 This brings us back to the way in which the material facts are formulated, and raises the question of whether there are alternatives to the current construction of s 223(1).
III RE-INTERPRETING THE MATERIAL FACTS?
In endeavouring to understand how historical perspectives can fit within the adjudicative process, this article has so far suggested that historians can assist in the inferential proof of the material facts by providing generalisations of knowledge. The question remains, however, whether understandings of history can extend further to inform the very way in which the material facts for native title are defined. That is, do historians' approaches to the past have utility for how courts interpret s 223(1), from which the material facts are derived? This issue does not embrace the work of historians as expert witnesses at trial in providing analyses of historical data, but it does raise its own difficult questions of process. These questions concern the extent to which judicial interpretation can be rendered accountable, in terms of both the information considered and the construction adopted. 159 Although beyond the scope of this article, there is a need for further examination of the extent to which understandings of history can legitimately influence legal interpretations, and how such understandings might be incorporated into the adjudicative process. 160 While cognisant of these further issues, this part examines the prior question of whether historians can assist courts as they choose which facts are selected as 'material' if certain ends are to be achieved. To do this, it examines -in general terms -the ways that historians understand the discovery of the past, and their tendency to recognise the elusiveness and indeterminacy of that process. The purpose of this discussion is not to delve into historiographical debates between different schools of history, but to compare the reasons why and the ways in which historians and lawyers use facts. In addressing whether historians might contribute to the selection of the material facts, this part is not concerned with alternative bases upon which title may be recognised, 161 but with the scope for interpretation inherent in s 223(1) of the NTA.
In interpreting these statutory words courts are required to give effect to the intention of the legislature in enacting the NTA. 162 This process of interpretation does not take place in a vacuum, but is informed by context. 163 This context includes the Act as a whole and the purposes for which it was enacted. As the Preamble to the NTA makes clear, Parliament sought to recognise and remedy the dispossession and disadvantage suffered by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This points against a restrictive interpretation of the word 'traditional'. 164 Such a contextual approach recognises both the time-span and nature of the task at hand. For native title, this includes an awareness of the difficulties of giving reality to a segment of the past, and the historical and legal intersections of indigenous and non-indigenous cultures.
A
Historians and the elusive discovery of the past Historians might inform how courts interpret the material facts by providing insights into the types of decisions that can reasonably be made about the past. Although there are many styles and methods of historical inquiry, 165 historians tend to agree that 'history' can never definitively capture the past. 166 While historians continue to disagree about the correlation that is possible between the past and its depictions, recent debates about postmodernism and objectivity have engendered certain scepticism about the very possibilities of historical knowledge. 167 This understanding of the difficulties of reconstructing the past is accompanied by a particular approach to facts. While there are obvious methodological differences between legal 168 and historical 169 processes of fact-finding, it is not clear that there is any conceptual difference in how the notion of a 'fact' is understood. While the disciplines will often seek out different types of facts (depending on the questions asked), 170 for both groups 'facts' are descriptive statements about the world. The content of these descriptive statements is capable of almost infinite variety, but this is equally true of the historian's and the lawyer's facts.
While both lawyers and historians rely on 'facts' in their attempt to approximate the past, the place of facts within legal decision-making and historical inquiry differs. Historians, on the whole, are less interested in discrete propositions (such as whether X killed Y on a particular date). As Ronald J Allen points out, historians do on occasion focus on such narrow questions that anticipate a 'yes/no' answer, but 'such cases are not a paradigm but a limit of the nature of historical inquiry'. 171 More often, historians seek to understand why things happened and to establish broader patterns of understanding about the past. 172 According to Allen, for historians the battle is fought at the level of competing visions, not at the level of individual fact, and factual details are put to the service of establishing that the organizing vision is more likely than those offered in opposition. 173 This means the historian will often cast more widely than the lawyer in their process of fact selection: while the fact that X killed Y may still be relevant, it is likely to be accompanied by a multitude of other facts that together create a more complete picture of the past.
In this picture, an individual or specific fact will rarely be decisive. This has a bearing on whether errors of fact (which may be exposed by the discovery of new evidence) will negate the ultimate conclusion reached. For the historian, some factual errors may at times be tolerated without the argument as a whole losing its persuasive force. 174 For the lawyer, the consequence of factual errors will very much depend on what other evidence was used to prove the material facts. If individual facts in an inferential chain are later disproved, the particular inferential strand will collapse. If there is no other evidence, or several inferential strands collapse, the material facts may be unable to be proved. 175 
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Volume 36 ____________________________________________________________________________________ These differing roles ascribed to individual facts are illustrated by the debates about the representation of Australia's past, known as the 'History Wars', which have divided popular and academic commentators. 176 Keith Windschuttle, adopting a narrow approach to the discovery of facts, has attempted to show that other scholars' estimations of the number of Tasmanian Aborigines killed are inaccurate. 177 For the historians under attack these criticisms largely miss the point as their theories, which attempt to capture some of the complexity of Aboriginal-European interactions, are about more than mere numbers.
Given that historians use facts in this way, and generate scepticism about the possibility of uncovering the past definitively, can the approaches of historians assist courts in defining the material facts?
B
Critiquing the current selection of the material facts As explained in Part I, the current interpretation of s 223(1) of the NTA represents a narrow approach to the formulation of the material facts. It emphasises the presovereignty nature of laws and customs, and the need to prove a substantially unbroken chain of connection between past and present.
There have already been some attempts to analyse native title jurisprudence in terms of 'history', though these analyses tend to focus on the historian's perspective rather than how it is that 'history' can be incorporated into the court process. Alex Reilly and Ann Genovese, for instance, argue that in framing the test in this way the High Court has adopted an 'antiquarian' approach to history. 178 Their critique is based on the pivotal place given to the assertion of sovereignty by the majority in Yorta Yorta. 179 Reilly and Genovese suggest that the majority's interpretation is not properly justified in terms of legal theory, as it misunderstands the impact of the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown. Referring to the writings of Dicey, they suggest that the capacity of the new power to recognise rights and interests created by a different legal system does not pose a challenge to sovereignty, meaning that the Court failed to address the more important question of the 'extent of recognition'. 180 Moreover, Reilly and Genovese argue that this positioning of sovereignty as the decisive point in the intersection of the two normative systems is not historically justified. The focus on traditional law and custom at a 'fixed point', the moment of sovereignty, effectively means that native title rights are static and incapable of evolution. 181 This conclusion, they argue, is 'ahistorical in nature', because it ignores what 'was happening as a matter of historical fact '. 182 By adopting this approach, Reilly and Genovese contend, the majority exhibit an unsophisticated understanding of history whereby the past is 'knowable in its entirety '. 183 This approach is based on the 'illusion of a determinate past', 184 and is underpinned by 'a central, unifying conceit about the nature of history: that the past can be declared in a finite manner and, because of this, is interchangeable with a notion of history.' 185 If Reilly and Genovese's argument is understood in evidentiary terms, it can be seen that their criticisms really are directed to the Court's formulation of the material facts. Essentially, their argument suggests that through this stipulation of the material facts the courts are searching for the wrong past: a past that is fixed and simply waiting to be unearthed. While the past may not be able to be captured finitely or conclusively, this does not mean that it cannot be captured at all. Rather, what will be captured is always an approximation. The real point to be gleaned from Reilly and Genovese's criticisms, then, is that the courts are searching for the wrong type of approximation, and therefore selecting the wrong material facts.
The approximation demanded by the current interpretation of s 223(1) requires a strict chain of continuity since sovereignty, only tempered by the qualification 'substantially'. 186 This strict, linear approach to the definition of the material facts requires the proof of facts over a long stretch of time, with little possibility for change or adaptation. That the past can be captured with such specificity runs contrary to the understandings of historians, and means that the place of individual factual findings may be decisive. For instance, as in Yorta Yorta, if the claimants cannot establish a continuous connection, the whole claim fails. However, this selection of the material facts (involving a chain of specific factual links from past to present) is clearly not the only approach possible within the parameters set down by s 223(1).
C
History and the selection of the material facts? As this article suggests, alternative formulations of the material facts may be more consistent with the approaches of historians. The judgment of the minority of the High Court in Yorta Yorta demonstrates that alternative constructions of s 223(1) are possible. Furthermore, even within the constraints set by the High Court in Yorta Yorta, subsequent Federal Court judgments demonstrate the capacity of the provisions of the NTA to accommodate historical understandings.
D
The minority in Yorta Yorta: an alternative view Gaudron and Kirby JJ, in dissent, offered an alternative interpretation of the material facts. Their Honours agreed with the other members of the Court that the content of the rights and interests held under traditional laws and customs had to be proved, 187 but they disagreed about the extent to which continuity was required. In their view, it was not necessary that the rights and interests 'have been continuously availed of in relation to land, or, even, that they are presently availed of.' 188 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 183 Ibid 37. 184 In addition, Gaudron and Kirby JJ disagreed with the requirement that the connection with the land must be 'substantially maintained' since the time of sovereignty. 189 In their view, s 223(1)(b) required only that there be a 'present connection' to the land or waters in the claim area: 190 The relevant issue under s 223(1)(a) and (b) of the Act is simply whether the Yorta Yorta people now acknowledge and observe traditional laws and traditional customs by which they have a connection with the land and waters claimed by them. 191 Further:
There is nothing in that paragraph or any other part of the definition of 'native title' or 'native title rights and interests' which requires that 'traditional connection with the land … [be] substantially maintained '. 192 This differing selection of the material facts hinged upon a different understanding of the word 'traditional'. In their construction, 'traditional' merely required that the laws and customs 'have their origins in the past'. 193 It was not necessary to prove that ancestors of the claimants observed the same laws and customs, but simply that the current laws and practices 'had a sufficient degree of continuity with the past '. 194 This interpretation allows for a greater degree of change over time. Gaudron and Kirby JJ explicitly stated the current laws and customs did not have to 'correspond exactly' 195 with those acknowledged and observed pre-sovereignty, but that the differences 'should constitute adaptations, alterations, modifications or extensions made in accordance with the shared values or the customs and practices of the people '. 196 This approach to the formulation of the material facts still involves making some findings about the observance of laws and customs in the past, but the degree of similarity that is required between past and present is different. Gaudron and Kirby JJ's approach stems, in part, from their appreciation of the historical realities of dispossession which, as they noted, is one of the considerations listed in the Preamble to the NTA. European settlement, their Honours commented, 'almost certainly rendered the observance of traditional practices impracticable in a number of respects.' 197 Recognising this, the construction adopted by Gaudron and Kirby JJ sought a different type of approximation of the past: one that permits a greater degree of change over time, and places less emphasis on proving individual facts in an unbroken chain from past to present. It is thus more consistent with both the history of colonisation and how historians approach the reconstruction of the past.
Interestingly, the Full Federal Court has recently attempted to align the minority interpretation with that of the majority. In Moses v State of Western Australia, in the context of a cross-appeal by the State and Commonwealth as to whether native title existed in a particular portion of the claim area, the Commonwealth argued that the trial judge had erroneously adopted the approach of the Yorta Yorta minority rather than that of the majority. 198 The Full Court (Moore, North and Mansfield JJ) rejected this argument, holding that the selected paragraphs did not establish the suggested difference in approach. According to the Full Court the difference between the minority and majority judgments 'does not lie in the statements of principle, but in the application of the principle to the facts of the case'. 199 The difference of approach contended for by the Commonwealth was based upon a comparison of a particular paragraph from the minority judgment with a paragraph from the majority judgment. The Full Court extracted these two paragraphs, and commented that they did not establish the suggested difference of approach. However, as this article submits, the selected passages are not representative of the judgments as a whole. The Full Court's brief reasoning lacks a detailed analysis of precisely how the minority interpreted the requirements of s 223(1). When this is done, it is clear that there is a difference in approach, and that the minority does offer an alternative selection of the material facts required to prove native title.
E
Section 223(1) since Yorta Yorta Since the High Court's decision in Yorta Yorta the Federal Court, at both trial and appellate levels, has grappled with the High Court's reading of the s 223(1) requirements and the application of these requirements to different factual settings. Despite the constraints set down by the High Court, the jurisprudence emerging from the Federal Court demonstrates that all is not settled in relation to the elements of proof.
Similarly to the minority in Yorta Yorta, in De Rose the Full Federal Court supported an approach that places less emphasis on strict historical continuity. The Court was required to apply the construction of s 223(1) as articulated by the majority of the High Court in Yorta Yorta. In De Rose it was found that while an Aboriginal society had once occupied the claim area, there was no biological connection between the claimants and those who occupied the area prior to sovereignty. Most of the claimants had moved to the claim area from the west after the date of sovereignty, due to drought, resources, shelter, and marriage. 200 At first instance O'Loughlin J considered it unnecessary for the claimants to prove biological descent from those occupying the claim area at the time of sovereignty, but that some degree of continuity was necessary. 201 He held that the claimants formed part of a larger Western Desert Bloc society, and that the migratory movements of the claimants could be accepted 'as part of the history and social structure of the Aboriginal people of the Western Desert Bloc'. 202 This was sufficient to connect the claimants with those Aboriginal peoples occupying the area prior to sovereignty. 203 On appeal to the Full Federal Court the respondents disputed this finding. 204 Although there were some variations in the formulation of the arguments, essentially it was contended that post-sovereignty population shifts meant that the claimants' society was 'not a continuation of the pre-sovereignty society connected with the land.' 205 However, the Full Court held that the population shifts had occurred in accordance with the traditional laws and customs of the Western Desert Bloc, and were sufficient to constitute a connection with the land for the purposes of s 223(1)(b). 206 It was not disputed that the Western Desert society had had a continuous existence since sovereignty, nor that the traditional laws and customs of the Western Desert society had been acknowledged and observed substantially uninterrupted since that time. 207 Whether such a connection (by virtue of the wider Western Desert Bloc) is sufficient remains a question to be determined by the High Court. 208 This issue turns on how the requirement of 'connection' is interpreted, and whether adherence to a wider set of traditional laws and customs is sufficient to connect the claimants to the land. The Full Court's approach in De Rose places less emphasis on strict historical continuity, which has a bearing on the facts necessary to constitute a connection with the land. The Court's interpretation and application of s 223(1) may appear to loosen the strict Yorta Yorta requirements, in the sense that the type of past that the claimants are required to approximate is quite different. Instead of a strict linear chain of continuity, the Court was prepared to accept that adherence to a wider set of laws and customs, under which there were considerable population shifts postsovereignty, could constitute a connection. This approach recognised the peculiar history and hardships of life in the Western Desert area, where the bleak nature of the land necessitated movement. 209 Wilcox J's September 2006 determination in Bennell v State of Western Australia 210 also appeared to be a departure from the strict Yorta Yorta requirements of continuity, although the Full Court has recently overturned key aspects of the judgment. 211 The Bennell determination concerned native title applications made over land and waters in and around metropolitan Perth. Wilcox J found that native title had continued to exist despite substantial changes since settlement. His judgment was hailed as a 'broader, more flexible' approach to the requirements of s 223. 212 While citing the Yorta Yorta majority's insistence that laws and customs have continued 'substantially uninterrupted' since sovereignty, Wilcox J's interpretation of what can constitute such 'substantial' continuity seemed to differ from that of the majority. In assessing how much change is 'tolerable', Wilcox J interpreted the Yorta Yorta majority to mean that 'one should look for evidence of the continuity of the society, rather than require unchanged laws and customs'. 213 In assessing whether the requisite continuity was present, Wilcox J stressed the need to look at all the circumstances of the case, including 'whether the changes seem to be the outcome of factors forced upon the community from outside its ranks'. 214 This awareness of the realities of colonial settlement seemed to influence his assessment of the changes. For example, when noting that there were changes to the descent rules his Honour commented that such changes 'must have been inevitable, if the Noongar community was to survive the vicissitudes inflicted upon it by European colonisation and social practices.' 215 Similarly, when addressing the fact that 'home areas' inhabited by estate groups had largely disappeared, Wilcox J noted that while this was a 'significant change' it was 'readily understandable' as it had been 'forced upon the Aboriginal people by white settlement'. 216 Wilcox J's approach to approximating the past took a broader historical view, which allowed him to conclude that changes over time were mere adaptations and not a complete interruption or break with the past. His Honour concluded that [t] here is no doubt that enormous forces have assailed Noongar society since 1829, making it impossible for many of the traditional laws and customs to be maintained. However, when I come back to the test stated in Yorta Yorta, and ask myself whether the normative system revealed by the evidence is 'the normative system of the society which came under a new sovereign order' in 1829, or a 'normative system rooted in some other, different society', there can only be one answer. The current normative system is that of the Noongar society that existed in 1829, and which continues to be a body united, amongst other ways, by its acknowledgement and observance of some of its traditional laws and customs. It is a normative system much affected by European settlement; but it is not a normative system of a new, different society. 217 The Full Court, however, disagreed with Wilcox J's interpretation of the continuity requirement in s 223. The Full Court held that Wilcox J, in asking whether the community that existed at sovereignty had continued to exist, did not pose the continuity question in the form required by Yorta Yorta. The trial judge, according to the Full Court, was required to ask whether the laws and customs have continued to be acknowledged and observed substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty, and had erred in failing to do so. 218 According to the Full Court, the continuity of a society does not necessarily mean that the rights and interests will remain unchanged. 219 Further,
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[H]is Honour thought the effects of change could be mitigated by reference to white settlement. That is not a process contemplated by Yorta Yorta. ... [I]f, as would appear to be the case here, there has been a substantial interruption, it is not to be mitigated by reference to white settlement. The continuity enquiry does not involve consideration of why acknowledgement and observance stopped. 220 This stricter approach to historical continuity adopted by the Full Court, and close adherence to Yorta Yorta, reflects the approach taken in Risk v Northern Territory of Australia. At first instance Mansfield J dismissed the applications for native title on the ground that the current laws and customs observed were not 'traditional' in the requisite sense. Mansfield J found that the Larrakia people are the 'same society as that which existed previously, including at settlement'. 221 His Honour found that up until the first decade of the 20 th century the Larrakia people continued to enjoy rights and interests under laws and customs that were the same (or substantially similar) to those that existed at settlement. However, his Honour went on to find that during several decades of the 20 th century a combination of circumstances -significantly, the development of Darwin -'interrupted or disturbed the presence of the Larrakia people in the Darwin area' with the result that their current laws and customs could no longer be seen as 'traditional'. 222 The appeal to the Full Federal Court was dismissed. On appeal it was argued, amongst other things, that the trial judge had misapplied Yorta Yorta in determining that the Larrakia people's traditional laws acknowledged and customs observed had been discontinued during the twentieth century. 223 The appellants submitted that it was not relevant to ask whether there had been a substantial interruption in the practice of traditional laws and customs since sovereignty; rather, the relevant question was whether the present-day laws and customs had their origins in those that were observed at sovereignty. The Full Court rejected what was called a 'book end' approach:
It will be insufficient merely to examine the laws and customs of the present day and compare them with those that existed at sovereignty. Such a 'book end' approach has two significant dangers. First, it may lead to a conclusion that native title has continued throughout the period, when in fact the claimant group's customs and laws have been discontinued and later revived. Secondly, and more importantly for this appeal, if the laws and customs of the present day are not the same as at sovereignty, the book-end approach fails to ask the critical question whether the traditional laws and customs have ceased or whether they have merely been adapted. 224 The Full Court held that Mansfield J had not adopted such an approach, as he had considered the evidence of the intervening period and had considered whether the differences were the production of adaptation and modification or were so significant and substantial as to amount to interruption. 225 Further, the Full Court held that Mansfield J had not misunderstood the Yorta Yorta test. To the contrary, the Court held that his Honour had faithfully applied the Yorta Yorta construction to the question of whether there had been an interruption in the practice of traditional laws and customs. The Court set out several passages from Mansfield J's judgment where he explained, and re-iterated, the Yorta Yorta requirements. These passages, according to the Full Court, demonstrated that his Honour 'informed himself of the Yorta Yorta test and applied it to reach his conclusions'. 226 These recent Federal Court cases indicate there is continuing uncertainty about precisely how Yorta Yorta is to be applied. There is yet to be any clarification -or modification -of the requirements by the High Court.
CONCLUSION: THE HISTORIAN'S CONTRIBUTION
The contribution of historians to the litigation of native title claims must occur within the framework of the adjudicative process and the confines of the legislative test laid down in s 223 of the NTA. This article has clarified, from an evidentiary perspective, just how this contribution might occur.
Historians can assist at both stages of the process of inferential proof. First, historians' tendency to take a broad 'historical snapshot' 227 may influence how courts assess what evidence is considered relevant. Secondly, historians' experience in interpreting the colonial archive may inform the types of inferences that can reasonably be drawn. This requires recognition that judges are not always equipped to interpret the historical record without assistance, and that historians have unique expertise in this area which may assist the trier of fact.
In addition, the perspectives of historians may assist in the very definition of the material facts. The legislature has stipulated the test for proving native title in s 223(1), but the nature of the requisite factual inquiries falls to be determined by judicial interpretation. Although courts must decide whether a particular indigenous group is relevantly connected to the land as a matter of fact, there is scope for interpretation in how this historical connection is defined and what degree of continuity with the past will suffice. Historians' scepticism about uncovering the past definitively, and the ways in which they use facts, may provide a justification for taking a particular view of the material facts. It remains to be seen whether the High Court will continue down its present path of strict historical continuity, or will endorse an approach to the approximation of the past that is more consistent with the understandings of historians.
The extent to which historians' perspectives can legitimately provide a contextual influence on the interpretation of s 223(1) remains a matter for further consideration. The differing roles and responsibilities of courts and historians make it clear that judicial interpretations cannot be evaluated solely in terms of understandings of history. However, the notion of 'informed interpretation', 228 which is reflected in _____________________________________________________________________________________ 225 Ibid [83] - [85] . 226 Ibid [98] . An application for special leave to the High Court was dismissed by majority on 31 August 2007. 227 Yorta Yorta (2001) 110 FCR 244, 263 [59] (Black CJ). 228 Bennion, above n 163, 499-508. s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), provides a gateway for courts to consider other material in the interpretation of statutes. The extent to which historians' perspectives, in contributing to a fully informed reading of legislative provisions, can be accommodated in this way clearly warrants further investigation. The very nature of native title, encompassing as it does statutory terms of uncertain reach 229 and the proof of historical facts, suggests historians have an important contribution to make. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 229 Connolly, above n 159, 118-21.
